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Stacey Curry was killed while walking through a parking lot to 
her office.1 She was struck and run over by a delivery truck.2 The 
driver said he thought he had gone over a speed bump. The police 
officer on the scene could not explain how the driver did not see 
her: there were no parked cars limiting visibility, it was a sunny 
day, and the posted speed limit was low.3 Telesfora Escamilla was 
 
 1. Patricia Callahan, Amazon Pushes Fast Shipping but Avoids Responsibility for the 
Human Cost, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/us/
amazon-delivery-drivers-accidents.html. 
 2. Patricia Callahan, His Mother Was Killed by a Van Making Amazon Deliveries.  
Here’s the Letter He Wrote to Jeff Bezos, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 5, 2019, 1:59 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/his-mother-was-killed-by-a-van-making-amazon-
deliveries-heres-the-letter-he-wrote-to-jeff-bezos. 
 3. See id. 
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also killed by a delivery truck in a hurry.4 It was sunny when she 
crossed the street in a marked crosswalk, three blocks from her 
home, three days before Christmas.5 A twenty-two-year-old man 
was killed when another delivery vehicle turned left into his 
motorcycle.6 The driver was apparently distracted, or else not even 
paying attention.7 These three and at least seven others were killed 
by collisions with Amazon delivery trucks.8 
Amazon exercises extraordinary control over its delivery 
providers, determining the routes of vehicles, tracking movements, 
and keeping time.9 Amazon also exercises control over hiring and 
firing drivers,10 but it has been able to avoid liability for the ten 
deaths and sixty other “serious injuries” caused by their vehicles by 
placing a legal firewall between itself and the drivers—many of 
whom drive Amazon-branded vans.11 Amazon separates itself 
from the delivery-driver-tortfeasors by contracting with separate 
companies, often limited liability corporations (LLC) financed by 
Amazon, who drive the vehicles that provide the “final mile” 
delivery services. These separate companies then employ or 
contract drivers to perform the labor, insulating Amazon from 
liability when a tort occurs. This allows Amazon to set stricter and 
quicker delivery goals without being confronted by the liability for 
the resulting torts, including the taking of human life.12 
 
 4. Caroline O’Donovan & Ken Bensinger, Amazon’s Next-Day Delivery Has Brought 
Chaos and Carnage to America’s Streets—But the World’s Biggest Retailer Has a System to Escape 
the Blame, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:14 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/carolineodonovan/amazon-next-day-delivery-deaths. 
 5. Id.; Christian Farr, Former Amazon Driver Acquitted in Death of 84-Year-Old Woman, 
NBC5 CHICAGO (Aug. 1, 2019, 7:55 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/
former-amazon-driver-acquitted-in-death-of-84-year-old-pedestrian/127151/. 
 6. Callahan, supra note 1. 
 7. O’Donovan & Bensinger, supra note 4. The driver thought he had hit a pole, when 
in fact he had cut off the motorcyclist and braked, causing the motorcycle to lose control and 
slide. Id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Hayley Peterson, “Amazon Has All the Power”: How Amazon Controls Legions of 
Delivery Drivers Without Paying Their Wages and Benefits, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 4, 2018, 9:54 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-controls-delivery-drivers-without-paying-
wages-2018-9. 
 10. David Ingram & Jo Ling Kent, Inside Amazon’s Delivery Push: Employees and Drivers 
Say an Overworked System Is Lax on Safety as Packages Pile Up, NBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2019, 2:30 
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/inside-amazon-s-delivery-push-employees-
drivers-say-overworked-system-n1087661. 
 11. Callahan, supra note 1. 
 12. See Peterson, supra note 9. 
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Amazon is not the only company that uses subcontracted 
services to shield itself from liability. It has been a long-standing 
way for a company to reduce its own risk of liability by passing the 
burden to a contractor or even a properly capitalized subsidiary. 
Amazon is not alone in the field of companies relying on unskilled, 
untrained labor to fulfill what, at times, can be extremely 
dangerous work. 
Similar liability maneuvers have empowered an entire 
economy of so-called “gig companies.”13 Gig companies disrupt 
established, often regulated industries, by connecting service 
customers with “able” providers. Among the biggest names in the 
gig economy, a common strategy has emerged which seems to 
propel their success: identify a regulated industry, find loopholes 
to reduce or eliminate the regulatory hurdles, and most 
importantly, call yourself a tech company and distance yourself 
from the end-provider.14 Though many gig workers perform  
risky tasks, like driving, on strict deadlines, the employers mostly 
avoid the cost of providing training or supervision. Even those  
who require some level of training, supervision, or competency 
checks must face the reality of a marketplace that incentivizes  
the companies to grow their workforce at unprecedented rates,15 
while minimizing labor costs.16 Part of that minimization is 
 
 13. Gig company refers to those entities that produce revenue by engaging in the gig 
economy. The gig economy was recognized in Merriam-Webster’s “Words We’re Watching” 
and added to the dictionary in 2019. Words We’re Watching: “Gig Economy”, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/gig-economy-use-origin-
phrase (last visited May 1, 2021). First used in 2009, gig economy refers to “economic 
activity that involves the use of temporary or freelance workers to perform jobs typically 
in the service sector.” Gig Economy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/gig%20economy (last visited May 1, 2021). 
 14. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(in suit brought by Uber drivers, the court dissects Uber’s arguments that it should not be 
treated like a taxi company because it is a “‘technology company,’ not a ‘transportation 
company’”). 
 15. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, BROOKINGS INST., A PROPOSAL FOR 
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT 
WORKER” 6 (Brookings Inst., 2015), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/
gig_economy_slides.pdf (presenting a chart of Uber driver growth). 
 16. Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/
uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html (describing how Uber manipulates drivers in “a 
quest for a perfectly efficient system: a balance between rider demand and driver supply at 
the lowest cost to passengers and the company”). 
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reducing or altogether eliminating the company’s liability for its 
untrained workers. 
In the “gig economy,” companies rely on various legal 
maneuvers to prevent the negative impacts of their service-
products from costing the companies big. While Amazon and 
others are able to use separate corporate entity arguments to avoid 
the legal liability, the same technique would prevent gig companies 
from expanding at the rate needed to capture investment dollars.17 
If every individual driving for the ostensible “rideshare” company 
was required to jump through the hoops of forming a separate 
company there would not be enough drivers to service the user 
base needed to make the company successful. Most gig companies 
rely on other common law techniques to shield the companies from 
liability. Uber has argued that all of its drivers are independent 
contractors, precluding almost all company liability for acts of their 
drivers under principles of respondeat superior.18 But as the 
companies grow and deepen their pockets, the plaintiffs’ bar will 
continue to challenge the assertion, sometimes with at least a 
modicum of success.19 However, even when plaintiffs overcome the 
independent contractor status, respondeat superior limits liability 
to acts taken in pursuit of the employer’s business, leaving some 
passengers no recourse against the companies for torts perpetrated 
by drivers who were both vetted by the company and assigned by 
the company to pick up the passenger. 
Some jurisdictions have attempted to address the matter of  
gig-worker independent contractor status legislatively, either 
restricting the activities of gig companies or altogether preventing 
the companies from operating due to the health and safety risks.20 
 
 17. See, e.g., Nathan Heller, Is Venture Capital Worth the Risk?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 20, 
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/27/is-venture-capital-worth-the-
risk (lamenting venture capital’s effect on startups, specifically the push to quickly scale). 
 18. See, e.g., Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (D.D.C. 2015) (passenger 
attacked by driver); Yi v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 18-C-355, 2018 WL 5013568 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 
2018) (passenger paralyzed after crash caused by driver); Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 
F. Supp. 3d 774 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (passenger raped by driver). 
 19. See, e.g., Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Donovan v. 
DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985)) (reversing summary judgement on the 
question of whether plaintiff Uber drivers are in fact independent contractors, explaining 
that because factual issues existed for questions under the Donovan test the district court’s 
finding was not a matter of law and therefore a jury was needed to resolve the factual disputes). 
 20. See, e.g., Adam Satariano & Amie Tsang, Uber Is Fighting to Survive in London After 
Losing Its License, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/
business/uber-london.html. 
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But those efforts have struggled to gain traction, been temporary in 
nature, or been reversed by ballot initiatives.21 In California, 
legislation classifying gig workers as employees was overturned by 
a referendum backed by the gig companies, who leveraged the 
threat of unemployment and higher fares to turn out gig-worker, 
and rider, votes.22 The result in California is legislation that 
classifies gig drivers as independent contractors. The legislation 
excludes any application in tort-related claims, but the scenario 
illustrates a potential path forward for the gig companies. 
A final method that gig companies are pursuing to remove the 
liability for employees’ and contractors’ torts is removal of the 
human labor altogether—for example, by offering automated 
drone delivery23 and driverless cars.24 This raises other questions  
of liability which, although not addressed in this Note, may be 
resolved in the same manner as those involving the torts of  
gig-workers. 
This Note addresses a new imbalance in the tort system caused 
by the proliferation of gig companies in recent years. It starts by 
looking at how the law is currently failing. It then addresses 
approaches others have considered for dealing with the new 
 
 21. See Chris Marr, New Jersey Gig Worker Bills Go to Governor, But Not “Big One”, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 13, 2020, 6:49 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
report/new-jersey-gig-worker-bills-go-to-governor-but-not-big-one (“[E]fforts to pass a 
California-style worker classification law will start over immediately” after state congress 
fails to meet the mark.); Uber Spared From London Ban Despite “Historical Failings”, BBC (Sept. 
28, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54322579 (London court overturns Uber’s 
ban on service within the city); Faiz Siddiqui, Uber, Other Gig Companies Spend Nearly $200 
Million to Knock Down an Employment Law They Don’t Like—and It Might Work, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 26, 2020, 12:19 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/09/
prop22-uber-doordash/ (Uber and others lobby and advertise the ultimately-successful 
Proposition 22 in California, overturning a prior bill that challenged the independent 
contractor status for gig workers). 
 22. Suhauna Hussain, Uber, Lyft Push Prop. 22 Message Where You Can’t Escape It: Your 
Phone, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/
story/2020-10-08/uber-lyft-novel-tactics-huge-spending-prop-22 (“Last week the ride-
hailing app served users with a pop-up threatening that if voters failed to pass Proposition 
22 on the Nov. 3 ballot, wait times and prices would ratchet up, and drivers would lose their 
livelihoods. To move forward with ordering a ride, users had to tap the ‘confirm’ button on 
the message.”). 
 23. Amazon Prime Air, AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-
Air/b? node=8037720011 (last visited Mar. 11, 2021). 
 24. Paul A. Eisenstein, Driverless Taxi Rides Are Headed Your Way this Year, NBC NEWS 
(Feb. 19, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/driverless-taxi-
rides-are-headed-your-way-year-n849371; Alison Griswold, Alphabet Is Coming for Uber, 
QUARTZ (Dec. 6, 2018), https://qz.com/1486469/waymo-googl-is-coming-for-uber-with-a-
driverless-taxi-service/ (“The driverless taxi race is on.”). 
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dilemma in assigning liability. These approaches are insufficient 
due to their disparate effects and the inefficiency of the judicial 
process—they merely incentivize a perpetual game of creative legal 
maneuvers for those who can afford the legal cost, without 
addressing the issue. Because so much of the gig economy is driven 
by transportation providers, a comparison to the evolution of taxi 
regulation and liability will be briefly addressed; however, the 
shortcomings of applying an industry-specific regulation to an 
entire economy of gig companies proves too limiting. By 
comparing the problem of gig-economy tort liability to the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century evolution of products liability, 
this Note ultimately proposes assigning strict liability to the company 
advertising its services. Finally, the Note concludes by briefly 
hypothesizing how the changes might impact the gig companies. 
I. GIG COMPANIES AND THE LAW CURRENTLY 
Tort law is not currently equipped to handle industries that are 
(1) wholly reliant on gig labor and (2) shielded from the gig 
laborers’ tortious actions. In this world, a “technology company” 
that derives most, if not all, of its revenue from a thirty percent  
cut of every payment on its ride hailing app is able to tell a court  
that it isn’t a taxi company, it’s a technology company.25 And a 
trillion-dollar company can expend a monumental effort and sum 
of money to make fast, cost-effective delivery a reality, yet still 
insist that they have no control over its delivery drivers.26 If finding 
 
 25. See Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(Judge Posner opining that the City of Chicago can treat gig transportation companies 
differently from taxi companies—effectively saying that they are different from taxi 
companies—by comparing the two to cats and dogs, “Most cities and towns require dogs 
but not cats to be licensed. There are differences between the animals. Dogs on average are 
bigger, stronger, and more aggressive than cats, are feared by more people, can give people 
serious bites, and make a lot of noise outdoors, barking and howling. Feral cats generally are 
innocuous, and many pet cats are confined indoors. Dog owners, other than those who own 
cats as well, would like cats to have to be licensed, but do not argue that the failure of 
government to require that the ‘competing’ animal be licensed deprives the dog owners of a 
constitutionally protected property right, or alternatively that it subjects them to 
unconstitutional discrimination.”). But see Jennings Brown, Uber’s Big Claim that It’s Not 
Really a Cab Company Is Bogus, EU Court Rules, GIZMODO (Dec. 20, 2017, 9:55 AM), 
https://gizmodo.com/uber-s-big-claim-that-it-s-not-really-a-cab-company-is-1821461427 
(reporting on the European Court of Justice declaring that Uber is a taxi company in the 
European Union). 
 26. See generally, Callahan, supra note 1 (discussing the significant efforts by Amazon 
to make fast delivery a reality while taking calculated steps to preserve a liability shield). 
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creative ways to dodge liability and regulation are cornerstones of 
the company’s ability to “innovate,” utilizing legal principles to 
hold the actor accountable might require upending the status quo. 
A. Respondeat Superior 
The principle of respondeat superior holds that a party is 
responsible for the acts of its employees “acting within the scope of 
their employment.”27 Respondeat superior is a form of vicarious 
liability for employers, holding the employer or company liable for 
torts which come about as a consequence of their business actions.28 
The intended result is that the social cost of doing business is partly 
placed on the party that stands to benefit. In this case, that party 
also happens to be best positioned to spread the cost of the risk in 
the form of higher prices for customers.29 If customers benefit 
enough to cover the social cost—passed on in the form of tort 
litigation—perhaps the market can justify perpetuating the risk. 
This satisfies the desire to make tort victims whole and the desire 
to hold the businesses accountable for accidents “which may fairly 
be said to be characteristic of its activities[,]”30 while also allowing 
society—in the form of the market—to arbitrate whether the cost  
is justified. 
B. In the Service of the Employer 
The subject of respondeat superior has been covered at length 
by others, but it serves to expound its basic principles in assigning 
liability, because respondeat superior is the current status quo for 
service-related torts. An employer is liable for the acts of employees 
who are engaged in actions in the furtherance of the business.31 Acts 
beyond this purpose are not covered by the doctrine.32 Acts directly 
linked to the business may be obvious, but in defining whether a 
non-business action can be tied to the employer, courts will 
generally look at whether the act fits the meaning of a “detour” or 
 
 27. Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994). 
 28. See Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676, 678–79 (Cal. 1986). 
 29. Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456–57 (1923) (noting  
the underlying principle of spreading the risk of inevitable torts across a larger group of 
people by holding the employer liable, allowing the cost of torts to be incorporated in the 
business costs). 
 30. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 31. Depew v. Crocodile Enters., Inc., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 676 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 32. Id. 
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a “frolic.”33 A detour is a minor departure from the employer’s 
charge, and torts during a detour may still create liability for the 
employer. A frolic is a major departure from the order of the 
employer, generally for the employee’s exclusive benefit.34 To 
balance the classification of an act, a court might look at the time, 
place, authorization, foreseeability and normalcy of the departure, 
purpose, and common sense, among other factors.35 Thus, a 
delivery driver who travels hundreds of miles into another state to 
visit a friend instead of performing deliveries has likely gone off on 
a frolic for which the employer will not be held accountable. But 
another driver who stops mid-delivery for lunch might only be 
considered to have detoured, resulting in liability for the employer 
if the driver causes a vehicular accident on the way to the diner or 
on the return to the delivery route. 
Concepts of detour and frolic can get even more tangled in the 
gig-economy context. Because the gig workers are frequently 
permitted to set their own schedule and usually have the power of 
election to choose or deny service requests, questions arise: At what 
point is the gig worker going about the business of the employer, 
and at what point are the actions truly a frolic? There may be an 
obvious delineation between an Uber driver who is on a road trip 
with her family and the same driver completing a ride with an Uber 
passenger in tow, but what about the times between providing 
rides to paying passengers?36 What about the time and space 
between dropping off a customer and returning to a high-demand 
area for the next pickup?37 Or the space between accepting a ride 
request and picking up the customer?38 Each of these questions 
 
 33. Id. at 676–77; see also Karangelen v. Snyder, 391 A.2d 474 (Md. 1978) (evaluating 
whether the actions of a police officer were adequately classified as a detour, rather than a 
frolic, by the lower court). 
 34. Pyne v. Witmer, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1309 (Ill. 1989). 
 35. Karangelen, 391 A.2d at 476. 
 36. Uber maintains $1,000,000 insurance policy for accidents caused when en route to 
pick up a rider, but significantly less for accidents caused while waiting for the next ride 
request. Auto Insurance to Help Protect You, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/
insurance/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). 
 37. E.g., Dan Levine, Uber Settles Wrongful Death Lawsuit in San Francisco, REUTERS (July 
14, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-crash-settlement/uber-settles-
wrongful-death-lawsuit-in-san-francisco-idUSKCN0PO2OW20150715 (describing Uber’s 
settlement with family of 6-year-old who was killed when an Uber driver struck her between 
accepting Uber assignments). 
 38. Uber addresses this directly in its insurance policy for drivers, but without the 
policy the line is not so clear. See id. 
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raises more doubts about the efficiency of such a framework in 
meting out liability to gig companies. 
C. Independent Contractors 
Beyond the question of whether the worker is going about the 
master’s service, and significantly more important to the calculus 
of liability, is the worker’s employment status. Almost exclusively, 
gig workers are classified as independent contractors. For 
respondeat superior claims, this is often a fatal distinction. 
The majority rule for respondeat superior in cases involving 
independent contractors says that if one hires an independent 
contractor and “retain[s] no control over the manner of its 
performance, he is not liable on account of negligence of the 
contractor or his servants.”39 Thus, for the vast majority of gig 
companies, the independent contractor status of gig workers 
precludes liability from being attached to the gig company for the 
tortious acts of the gig worker. The exceptions to this barrier for 
respondeat superior liability include when the tortious act was 
committed at the explicit behest of the employer40 or when the 
employer fails to exercise a reasonable amount of care in the hiring 
and retention of the independent contractor.41 
The typical gig company hires independent contractors to 
perform their services. The companies promote this arrangement as 
a special benefit for the gig workers—the ability to set your own 
hours and be your own boss—but the benefits are far more valuable 
for the gig companies who save time and money by reducing 
oversight, training, and management, not to mention by avoiding 
otherwise mandatory unemployment, social security, and 
Medicare taxes. 
The typical gig company will also require its contractors to 
accept and sign work contracts that stipulate the terms of the 
relationship,42 including any ongoing obligations. For example, a 
rideshare company uses these agreements and other verification 
methods to qualify drivers who have demonstrably good driving 
 
 39. Zirkle v. Winkler, 585 S.E.2d 19, 20 (W. Va. 2003). 
 40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 410 (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
 41. Id. § 411. 
 42. Frequently, these agreements explicitly state that the gig worker is an 
independent contractor. 
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records, proof of private licensure,43 and liability insurance.44 In this 
way, the companies can argue that they satisfy the requirement to 
exercise reasonable care in the retention of competent contractors. 
If a gig worker commits a tort that implicates the gig company, the 
company can simply claim that the work contract has been 
violated—placing a barrier between the company and subsequent 
litigation while the termination also provides evidence that the 
company has acted in a reasonable manner in the retention of 
contractors. Testing the inapplicability of respondeat superior for 
independent contractors is a two-edged sword that cuts both ways 
in favor of the gig companies. 
D. Recent Developments in Independent Contractor Tests 
There have been recent developments in California, 
Massachusetts, and Connecticut regarding the classification of  
gig workers as independent contractors.45 Given the enormous 
growth of gig economies, especially in densely populated areas, 
these states are at the forefront of handling gig-worker rights. One 
example of this classification change was in California, known as 
Assembly Bill 5 (AB5), which codified a three-part test previously 
expounded by the California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations 
West, Inc. v. Superior Court.46  
In addition to the traditional independent contractor 
requirement that (A) the work be free from the control and 
direction of the employer, the Dynamex test also requires that 
(B) the worker performs similar work outside the usual course of 
hiring for the employer’s business, and that (C) the worker be 
customarily and independently engaged in the established trade or 
occupation for which nature the contracted work is being 
 
 43. Private, not commercial licenses are the norm for ridesharing companies. 
 44. For example, the requirements to drive for Uber in the United States include at 
least one year of driving experience, valid U.S. driver’s license, an “eligible” four-door 
vehicle, proof of residency, proof of insurance, and a personal photo. Uber separately obtains 
the individual’s driving record and criminal history. Driver Requirements, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/requirements/ (last visited May 1, 2021). 
 45. Assemb. 5, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B 
(2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-222(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2017); see also Assemb. 5936, 218th Leg. (N.J. 
2019). Other states have gone the other direction, passing laws that classify some gig workers 
as “marketplace contractors.” See, e.g., H.R. 7087, 2018 Leg. (Fla. 2018); H.R. 1286, 120th Gen. 
Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018); H.R. 220, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019); S. 
1967, 1978 Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 1978). 
 46. Cal. Assemb. 5; Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). 
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performed.47 This test is creatively known as the ABC test for 
independent contractors.48 The purpose of California’s bill—and 
those of the other states—was disappointingly limited. The bill was 
created and passed to provide employee benefits for the gig 
workers, not to extend tort liability to the gig companies. 
Accordingly, even though these laws highlight the reclassification 
of many gig workers as employees, the benefits extend only as far 
as the drivers, not to the potential tort victims. 
The reticence of these state legislatures to tackle the inherent 
problem of tort liability in our gig economy is not entirely baffling. 
The companies provide labor opportunities and tax revenue. They 
are also popular. After AB5 was signed into law, Uber, Lyft, and 
others were able to get a referendum on the ballot which created an 
exemption in the ABC rule for gig drivers.49 The companies 
threatened to raise fees or stop services if the proposition did not 
pass, and the referendum passed with 59% of the vote.50 The 
companies still raised their fees.51 The revision of the terms for 
independent contractor status under bills like AB5 provides a clear 
opportunity to extend the independent contractor test to tort claims 
brought against those independent contractors. But instead, the 
California bill only codified the ABC test “for purposes of claims 
for wages and benefits arising under wage orders issued by the 
Industrial Welfare Commission,” excluding tort claims.52 There 
may be any number of justifications, but the simplest one makes the 
most sense: there are more workers than tort victims. 
 
 47. Cal. Assemb. 5. 
 48. John Myers, A Flood of Proposed Changes to California’s AB 5 Awaits State Lawmakers, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-02-28/
proposals-change-ab5-independent-contractors-labor-law-california; Allison Yano, The 
Devastating Ripple Effect of California’s New Gig Worker Laws, AM. GENIUS (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://theamericangenius.com/business-news/california-gives-part-time-workers-full-
time-benefits-with-ab5/. 
 49. Carolyn Said, Proposition 22, California Gig-Work Ballot Measure Backed by Uber and 
Lyft, Passes, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 6, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/
article/Proposition-22-California-gig-work-ballot-15699651.php. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Carolyn Said, Here’s What You’re Paying for Proposition 22, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 19, 
2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Here-s-what-you-re-
paying-for-Prop-22-15870617.php. 
 52. Assemb. 5, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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II. OLD APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING GIG LIABILITY 
Some scholars have suggested that addressing tort liabilities in 
a gig economy can be accomplished by relying on common law 
doctrines of respondeat superior and other forms of vicarious 
liability.53 However, years of data suggest that the gig companies 
have routinely avoided liability by chiefly relying on those same 
principles, gaining precedent in the process. This includes suits 
claiming everything from wrongful death54 and property damage,55 
to scooters causing trespass56 and private nuisance,57 to drivers 
assaulting58 and raping59 passengers. At this point, the weight of 
precedence far outweighs the notion of returning to the foundation 
of these tort principles.  
Reliance on common law forms of vicarious liability will only 
result in long-term maneuvering by the companies to further 
escape liability, perpetuating the problem and putting unnecessary 
and inappropriate reliance on the judiciary to adapt our laws. It 
would not be inconceivable, for instance, for Uber and other gig 
companies to follow the example of Amazon, using principles of 
corporation law and separate entities to create stronger barriers to 
responsibility. What then of the common law? 
III. HAVEN’T WE BEEN HERE BEFORE? TAXIS AND THE GIG 
 
 53. E.g., Agnieszka McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New Sharing Economy, 49 
CONN. L. REV. 171 (2016). 
 54. E.g., Annie McCormick, Woman Dies After Being Struck by Uber Driver in North 
Philadelphia, ABC6 PHILA. (June 1, 2016), https://6abc.com/traffic/woman-dies-after-being-
struck-by-uber-in-north-philadelphia/1365836/. 
 55. E.g., Checkey Beckford, 4 Hurt After Uber Driver Jumps Curb, Plows into Phone Store, 
Busy Restaurant in Chelsea: Police, NBC4 N.Y. (July 31, 2018), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/
news/local/car-hits-building-chelsea-uber-driver-nypd/524492/. 
 56. Lautemann v. Bird Rides, Inc., No. CV 18-10049 PA (RAOx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
123864 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2019). 
 57. Labowitz v. Bird Rides, Inc., No. CV 18-9329-MWF (SK), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
195982 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2019) (class action brought against scooter companies by mobility 
and visually impaired plaintiffs whose access to and use of public sidewalks has been impaired). 
 58. E.g., Sage Lazzaro, An Uber Driver has been Charged with Strangling a Student in a 
Dorm Parking Lot, OBSERVER (May 23, 2016), https://observer.com/2016/05/an-uber-driver-
has-been-charged-with-strangling-a-student-in-a-dorm-parking-lot/. 
 59. E.g., Tracey Lien, WeHo Woman Sues Uber for Negligence after being Raped by Driver, 
L.A. TIMES (July 21, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-la-
assault-20160721-snap-story.html. 
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ECONOMY 
Many plaintiffs have attempted to classify Uber, Lyft, and 
others as nothing more than taxi services, subject to the same 
heightened standard of care for passengers as other common 
carriers. Thinking about gig companies as taxis is an attractive 
model for handling torts in the gig economy.60 Unfortunately, 
although the evolution of taxi company liability provides an 
optimistic model of developing similar liability for gig companies, 
the regulations and precedent establishing the liability for taxi 
companies is uniquely tailored to transportation-focused gig 
companies. Applying the same rules to all gig companies will only 
produce gaps and loopholes in the same way applying traditional 
principles likely will. 
Several of the most prominent gig companies are based on the 
idea of ridesharing, an alternative to the traditional taxicab. In this 
ridesharing economy, almost anyone with an insured vehicle and a 
license to drive can participate as a service provider. Anyone with 
the app can hail a ride. This business model skirts the expensive 
regulations that bind regulated taxis.61 Existing taxi regulations 
have arguably raised the cost of taxi fares, but they also provide 
certain social benefits for the public and the workers engaged in the 
industry, including public safety by requiring minimum training, 
equality by requiring the taxis to provide a certain level of service 
to every passenger, and competitive wages for drivers in some 
areas by limiting the number of licensed cabs to prevent dilution of 
the market, while capping fares to protect customers.62 Some cities 
even collect special fees from taxi companies to help cover other 
social costs associated with the industry.63 
But the gig economy is not limited to rideshare services. Airbnb 
links would-be hoteliers with people seeking a spare room or 
house.64 Other companies provide cleaning, handyman, moving, 
 
 60. Consider a comparison of the argument (rejected by the court) in Association of 
Independent Taxi Operators, Inc. v. Kern, 13 A.2d 374 (Md. 1940), to that used by gig companies 
today: “The defendant contends that it has no liability because the management, direction, 
control, and supervision of drivers is in the owners of the cabs . . . .” Id. at 376. 
 61. TRANSP. RSCH. BD., BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MOBILITY: EXAMINING THE RISE 
OF TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED TRANSPORTATION SERVICES 38–51 (2016), https://www.nap.edu/
read/21875/chapter/5. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. About Us, AIRBNB, https://news.airbnb.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2021). 
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trucking, lawn care, and shopping services at the click of a button—
services provided not by employees, but by gig workers. 
Nevertheless, the development of liability for taxi services is a model 
for establishing liability for gig companies—with some limitations. 
Traditional taxi companies are viewed as an appropriate 
parallel because the structure is similar to many gig worker 
relationships. While some taxi companies own the vehicles and taxi 
licenses and employ drivers, often the company is nothing more 
than an association of independent drivers. These independent 
drivers own their own taxi-licensed vehicles and participate in an 
association of taxi drivers who rely on the association’s dispatch, 
training, regulatory, and other services.65 This relationship between 
an independent taxi driver and her taxi association has many 
parallels to the relationship between a gig worker and the gig 
company. For one, the association does not employ the driver; 
rather, the driver subscribes to the association’s service as a matter 
of efficiency. In some situations, the association has no involvement 
in the actual transportation service, but merely acts as a support 
organization for the drivers.66 
Despite this separation between taxi associations and drivers, 
and the apparent legal divide created by the separate entity and 
independent contractor status, decades of case law have resulted in 
a system of liability for cab companies, which, coupled with now-
established regulatory requirements in many jurisdictions, places 
liability on the cab companies for the acts of their drivers.67 
An obstacle with applying similar principles to gig companies 
is that the companies do not all take on the same form, and the 
specifically tailored regulation of taxi services does not provide a 
flexible framework for dealing with a range of industries and 
working arrangements under the gig umbrella. It does, however, 
 
 65. E.g., Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 134 F. Supp 3d 1108, 1110 (N.D. 
Ill. 2015) (in the precursor to Judge Posner’s cats-and-dogs comparison, supra note 25, court 
notes plaintiff’s complaint that taxi associations responsible for training, safety courses, 
continuing education, and ensuring that drivers and vehicles have been properly qualified 
and inspected, while Uber and others have a lower standard). 
 66. See generally CITY OF BOS., TAXI CONSULTANT REPORT, DRAFT ES.4 (2013), 
https://www.cityofboston.gov/news/uploads/6033_4_24_27.pdf; see also Ass’n of Indep. 
Taxi Operators, Inc. v. Kern, 13 A.2d 374 (Md. 1940) (weighing taxi association’s defense 
which was based in part on an explanation of its role in the taxi industry as a facilitator,  
not supervisor). 
 67. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Yellow Cab Affiliation, Inc., 73 N.E.3d 1220 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) 
(allowing claim against taxi association to continue because the association controlled the 
appearance of the taxi and the logo on its side). 
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demonstrate how changing perceptions of the public and the 
judiciary, coupled with increasing rates of litigation, may be a 
signal to the courts, regulators, and legislators that the opportunity 
to make changes to the law is ripe. 
IV. IS IT TIME TO EXPAND STRICT LIABILITY TO SERVICES? 
A. The Purposes of Tort Law 
There is no perfectly unified theory of tort law that adequately 
addresses all of its purposes. While this Note relies on surface-level 
abstractions of the underlying motivations for liability, 
compensation, and other damages, other articles suggest that this 
isn’t enough to understand the true purposes underlying tort law.68 
It does, however, suffice the purposes of this Note to claim that 
fulfillment of the surface-level purposes of tort law is enough to 
justify a closer look. The purposes of tort law are fourfold: 
(1) compensation, indemnity, or restitution to the harmed party in 
an effort to make them whole; (2) determination of rights; 
(3) punishment of wrongdoers and appropriate deterrence of the 
wrongful conduct; and (4) vindication of the parties to deter 
retaliation and unlawful self-help.69 Chief among the considerations 
for liability in the gig economy are restitution and appropriate 
deterrence. And the most appropriate model of tort liability to 
fulfill these purposes in this context is strict liability for services. 
B. Origins of and Justifications for Strict Products Liability 
Products liability largely developed due to the increasing 
limitations of the doctrine of privity on would-be tort plaintiffs.70 
Under the doctrine of privity, a person injured by a product could 
only sue someone who was party to the contracted sale of the 
product.71 With this limitation, retailers shielded the manufacturer 
or producer from liability for torts caused by the product, because 
the consumer was not in privity with the manufacturer—the 
consumer was only in privity with the retailer. Over the years, 
 
 68. See, e.g., Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320 (2017) 
(suggesting that the under purpose of tort law is to create community). 
 69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979). 
 70. See generally Morton R. Covitz, Comment, Products Liability: The Rise and Fall of 
Privity, 3 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 259 (1962). 
 71. Id. at 259. 
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courts identified the imbalance of incentives the privity 
requirement created, and the requirements were loosened. First, 
courts removed the requirement in situations where the defect or 
inherently dangerous product was fraudulently concealed.72 In 
1916, a New York case completely removed the privity requirement 
for any product that is likely to cause injury if negligently made.73 
Courts would later remove the fraud requirement altogether—a 
concealed defect coupled with putting the product into the 
marketplace was enough.74 From there, the expansion of products 
liability has developed to include liability for express warranties,75 
implied warranties,76 invalidation of disclaimers of implied 
warranty liability,77 and ultimately strict lability in tort for defective 
products.78 
The justifications for strict liability for defective products do not 
provide the full picture regarding its development, but they are 
informative when considering the evolution of a body of tort law to 
address a specific inadequacy in the law. One justification for strict 
products liability is that negligence is often too difficult for the 
injured party to prove. The burden of proof is especially heavy in 
an economy where the producer is often several degrees separated 
from the consumer—both by middlemen facilitators and 
geography. A second justification is that strict liability incentivizes 
safety. The safety argument has two parts. First, manufacturers are 
on notice of the strict liability nature of an offense, incentivizing the 
creation of products that will not cause litigation. Second, by 
 
 72. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 634 (Wash. 1913) (“It has been accepted as a 
general rule that a manufacturer is not liable to any person other than his immediate 
vendee . . . without privity of contract no suit can be maintained; [but] . . . certain exceptions 
have been recognized: (1) [w]here the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous 
kind[;] (2) [w]here the defendant has been guilty of fraud or deceit in passing off the article[;] 
(3) [w]here the defendant has been negligent in some respect with reference to the sale or 
construction of a thing not imminently dangerous.” (emphasis added)). 
 73. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 74. Jack Roach-Bissonnet, Inc. v. Puskar, 417 S.W.2d 262, 275 (Tex. 1967) 
(“Under Section 402B it is unnecessary that the ‘misrepresentation’ be made fraudulently or 
negligently.”); Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., 174 N.W.2d 752, 753 (Mich. 1970) (affirming 
summary judgement where there was no “hidden or concealed defect” in the product). 
 75. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932). 
 76. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); see also Escola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (discussing 
the merits of a strict liability schema for defective products). 
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reducing the burden on the plaintiff, it incentivizes potential 
plaintiffs to bring the claims. Putting the burden on the 
manufacturer is appropriate because the manufacturer is in the best 
position to prevent or mitigate the harm by designing and 
producing safe products free from defects. Additionally, the 
manufacturer is able to spread the cost of each claim across a larger 
swath of people, by incorporating the cost of damages into the 
pricing of the product. Finally, manufacturers induce consumer 
reliance on the expectation of safety when they put the product in 
the marketplace and therefore have a moral duty to stand behind 
their products.79 
The development of strict liability for defective products did 
not necessarily come about simply from judges weighing the 
positives and negatives of these justifications. The requirement of 
privity enjoyed a long-lasting tenure, bolstered by stare decisis, 
with judges reticent to go against the grain and complicate a large 
body of not only tort, but the many other commercial laws 
depending on the principle and protection of privity.80 What the 
anti-privity movement needed was a boost. 
C. The Industrial Age’s Role in Products Liability 
The evolution of products liability was catalyzed by the 
Industrial Revolution.81 During and after the Industrial Revolution, 
consumers were newly and increasingly separated from producers 
due to the development of industrial age factories and the advent 
of the steam engine, which more readily provided overland 
transport of the goods produced in the industrial cities to 
consumers across the country and world.82 Before this time, privity 
between the producer and the consumer was commonplace; 
however, this trend of separation continued to accelerate, and by 
the end of World War II, consumers were largely separated from 
 
 79. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41. 
 80. Consider here the comparative dilemma currently faced by judges and legislatures 
dealing with the classification of gig workers. 
 81. Covitz, supra note 70, at 259. 
 82. University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, The Ways that Industrialization Altered  
Patterns of Consumption, FOUNDS. OF W. CULTURE: THE INDUS. REVOLUTION (2016), 
http://foundations.uwgb.org/group-11/. 
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producers, maintaining privity with middlemen retailers instead.83 
The departure from the privity requirement was a recognition “that 
a sale of goods in 1961 differs from a corresponding sale in 1861.”84 
Instead of privity of contract between one consumer and one 
producer as before, industrialized America was increasingly 
condensed among fewer and fewer producers who relied on 
middlemen to complete the sale to consumers85—separating the 
producer from consumer effectively eliminated privity between the 
two parties, and by extension, the liability of the producer for 
claims of the consumer.86 One argument used in the rebuttal of the 
privity requirement was that advertisements and labels were 
enough inducement to the consumer to justify holding the 
manufacturer accountable for later injury to a “consumer who buys 
the product in reliance on such representations and later suffers 
injury because the product proves to be defective or deleterious.”87 
But the altogether elimination of the privity requirement took time 
and developed over decades. 
D. The Information Age’s Role in Service Liability 
Many of the same problems created by producer-consumer 
segregation in the Industrial Age have been resurrected in this 
latest phase of the Information Age. Where products and producers 
previously reigned, services and providers now dominate. And 
where the relationship between producer and consumer was 
previously disrupted during the Industrial Revolution, creating 
greater separation as producers consolidated separate from retail, 
today the relationship between the purveyor of services and the 
recipient has also evolved. The effect is analogous to the 
 
 83. Emanuel Emroch, Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: One Hundred Years of Products 
Liability Law, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 155 (1970) (noting the scientific and economic explosion 
following World War II that propelled the transformation “from the ancient mercantile 
society, where the seller and buyer usually met and bargained, to an impersonal market 
characterized by corporate organization, industrial and technological advancement and 
complexity, and sophisticated marketing and finance”). 
 84. Covitz, supra note 70, at 265. 
 85. The Development of Industrial United States 1870–1900, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., 
https://americanhistory.si.edu/presidency/timeline/pres_era/3_657.html (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2021). 
 86. The first producer to adopt this model set the stage for Uber and others some 100 
years later in their efforts to remove the burden of liability to consumers of its services and 
the general public. 
 87. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612, 615–16 (Ohio 1958). 
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breakdown of privity in products liability. Today, the separation of 
gig companies from the gig consumers has created a legal barrier 
that often prevents anyone from holding the companies 
accountable for its services. 
This isn’t the first time strict liability for services has been 
discussed. In the years during and after the period of strict products 
liability development, the question of differentiating between 
services and products was frequently addressed by courts.88 
Ultimately, the majority concluded that it was not time to extend 
the protection of strict liability to services. The justifications for not 
extending strict liability to services are threefold. First, the Second 
Restatement of Torts did not intend to include services within the 
umbrella of strict liability. Second, the idea of “defectiveness” is a 
meaningless standard for services. And finally, the application of 
strict liability for specific kinds of services is not warranted, either 
due to the nature of the service or because portions of the strict 
liability standard do not analogize as well as other bodies of law 
which may be applied in the circumstance.89 
The major flaws of the first and third justifications stand on 
their own regardless of how strict liability is being applied.90 
Whether or not the Restatement intended to include services within 
strict liability has no bearing on its application now. As for the 
application of strict liability for specific services, this can be carved 
out where appropriate. In areas where other regulations and 
existing tort schemes already provide a level of protection for the 
consumer, it may not be prudent to upend the status quo. However, 
the second, questioning the rationale of applying strict liability to 
service providers, has greater relevance now than ever. The 
argument then furthered by those opposed was that “[t]he salient 
feature of defectiveness is that (unlike negligence) it purports to 
evaluate the product rather than the manufacturer’s conduct.”91 In 
this way, opponents comment that by extending strict liability to 
 
 88. E.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Ct. App. 1973) (blood 
transfusion was a service, not a product, so no strict liability for plaintiff who contracted 
hepatitis from the transfusion); Kissel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1964) (excavation was a service, not a product, so no strict liability for damages causes by 
faulty excavation); Pierson v. Sharp Mem’l Hosp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 673 (Ct. App. 1989) (strict 
liability not warranted for services rendered at hospital). 
 89. William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict 
Liability, 62 N.C. L. REV. 415, 421–23 (1984). 
 90. See, e.g., id. at 419–20. 
 91. Id. at 420 (citing Phillips v. Kinwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974)). 
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services, the court would have to evaluate conduct. This misses the 
point. The purpose is to evaluate results of the service, not the 
provider’s conduct.92 The alternative is no different than a 
negligence standard. 
Extending strict liability to services seeks to promote a number 
of positive externalities—just as it does in the scope of products 
liability: (1) promote safety, (2) spread the cost of risk, (3) reduce 
the burden created by information asymmetry, (4) fulfill consumer 
expectations of service safety, (5) put the burden on the party  
best able to prevent injury, and (6) encourage fairness by holding 
the party who benefits most from the risk accountable.93 Before  
the rise of gig companies, purposes three and four were  
seen as “distinctions” between products and services—two  
arguments that at the time were applied to products but did  
not have a clear rationale for services.94 This discrepancy no  
longer exists. Companies are now distanced from their clients  
and their workers by technology, creating information gaps,  
while the company nevertheless advertises quality, reliability,  
and safety in their services—creating implied warranties that shape 
client expectations.95 
One of the issues earlier courts had with applying strict liability 
to services was that the “problem of proof” was not as acute in  
non-product cases as it was in products liability cases where the 
defendant was many steps removed from the plaintiff.96 Today, the 
purveyors of services, the gig companies, are further removed from 
the consumer than ever before. Consumers can hire and accept 
services from a gig worker without knowing their name, phone 
number, qualifications, or any other material information. The gig 
company, through its process of onboarding workers, has access to 
all of this information and more—though the particular practices of 
how the company determines who is and isn’t qualified to deliver 
the services is information unavailable to the consumer. 
The application of strict liability for services would put the 
companies on notice to optimize the risks created by their services. 
The optimization would be based not on the recommendations of 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 423–28. 
 94. Id. at 428. 
 95. Marketing Campaign E-mail from Uber Techs., Inc. (Feb. 10, 2021, 10:57 PM CST) 
(on file with author) (touting Uber’s commitment to and investment in rider safety). 
 96. Powers, supra note 89, at 422–23. 
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company ethics advisors, but by the costs of managing a 
relationship with society that includes plaintiffs and courts. Gig 
companies are the gatekeepers and managers of this system of 
incentives for gig workers, and they are therefore the entities best 
positioned to mitigate the risks of peer-to-peer services. Because 
they sit between the consumer and the providers of services, they 
are able to “monitor and channel” the behavior of all users97—a 
function which would also permit the companies to protect the 
welfare of consumers and the public. With GPS data, user reviews, 
and time logging, transportation-focused gig service companies 
could effectively enforce speed limits, traffic sign compliance, 
pedestrian and cyclist awareness, appropriate rest for drivers,  
and other similar tort-mitigating measures. All gig service 
companies could mitigate criminal and tortious acts by gig workers 
by conducting thorough background checks and providing 
appropriate training and other support resources. Still other issues 
might be mitigated by appropriate monitoring of workers. The 
emphasis in this context is on mitigation, rather than prevention. 
Even the best efforts will fall short of complete resolution of 
liability, but such efforts could at least bring gig companies in line 
with the societal expectations for other companies engaged in the 
same industries. 
E. One of Many Possible Exclusions for Strict Liability for Services 
In cases that have dealt with product-service combinations, 
courts have largely avoided the question of strict liability, leaving 
commentators to question whether the exemption was for all 
product-service combinations or simply an exemption for 
professional services.98 While this Note does not explore all of the 
justifications and consequences of exempting professional service 
providers from strict liability, it merits mention as an adaptation to 
the recommended strict liability for services. The problem with 
relying on regulation as the impetus, rather than shifting to strict 
 
 97. Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1628 (2017) (arguing that Uber and other gig-economy companies use 
their power and information to manipulate participants for their own gain). 
 98. Powers, supra note 89, at 416–18 (citing Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 388–89 
(Wis. 1977) (“Where ‘professional’ services are in issue the cases uniformly require that 
negligence be shown. We have found no decision of any court applying strict liability to the 
rendition of professional medical services.”)). 
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liability, was previously discussed in reference to taxi drivers.99 It 
is that the gig economy will continue to develop and morph at a 
rate faster than regulators are able to meaningfully control. And 
while the control may be desired, can the regulators do it in a way 
that does not stifle real and desirable innovation? The approach 
that encourages the most creativity is to draw the lines of liability 
and allow the gig companies to optimize their services to reduce 
the potential risk and costs associated with those liabilities. This 
approach is not foolproof and may need regulatory adjustments 
from time to time. 
The primary purposes of extending strict liability to services 
may still be largely fulfilled by state licensing and training for 
certain skilled services. For many of those gig services, existing 
frameworks for licensure already exist.100 For others, there is an 
obvious path forward, given existing frameworks in other 
jurisdictions or an obvious path to licensure. In fulfilling the 
purpose of tort law, such licensure might require training and other 
programs to promote safety by the service workers. The licensure 
would put the costs on the preventative rather than compensatory 
side of the equation, but it would still effectively spread the costs 
across all those who benefit from the services in order to achieve 
the desired mitigation. The asymmetry of information would be 
partially reduced because the requirements for licensure would be 
public record and the licensure could require renewals, audits, or 
some other form of periodic review—all of this would facilitate the 
exchange of information. There would also still exist a framework 
for strict liability for services which would apply in situations 
where the company failed to meet the requirements of the 
professional exception. The last three points of fulfilling 
expectations, putting the onus on the party best able to mitigate, 
and questions of fairness could all be handled in some degree by 
such regulations as well. 
This isn’t to suggest that outright exemptions for professionally 
licensed providers is equivalent to strict liability nor that other 
exceptions are less meritorious. The possibility of adapting the 
strict liability for services rule to fit other scenarios is available and 
should be evaluated further. 
 
 99. Supra Part III. 
 100. For example, several companies connect skilled trades with homeowners. State 
licensing for plumbers, electricians, general contractors, and others should largely fill the need. 
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F. The Economics of Strict Liability 
The general purpose of extending strict liability to services is 
the same as the rationale articulated by the courts that developed 
strict liability for products. As Justice Traynor wrote in an early 
products liability decision, 
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands 
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively 
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective 
products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer 
can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of 
others, as the public cannot.101 
The net social impact of this ideal may not be quantified 
immediately, but scholars have looked at the cost of strict liability 
in other settings—including the extension of strict liability to all 
forms of tort, thus eliminating the concept of negligence 
altogether.102 In their study of the subject, Richard Posner and 
William Landes concluded, 
If a change in the plaintiff’s activity is unlikely to be an efficient 
method of accident avoidance, but a change in the defendant’s 
activity is likely to be an efficient method, strict liability is an 
attractive rule. It will deter many accidents, and what we have 
called the claim cost of strict liability will be reduced.103 
Strict liability is attractive and efficient because there is not  
a clear path forward for changing the behaviors of potential  
gig-company tort plaintiffs, but there is a clear and simple path for 
changing the behaviors of the gig companies. This conclusion by 
Posner and Landes also brings to light a final point and a return to 
the beginning of the Note. Regardless of the type of service being 
offered, the strict liability for services must include not just 
consumers of the service, but bystanders. 
G. Claims by Innocent Bystanders 
The adoption of strict liability for service providers answers the 
question of liability when the consumer is harmed by a defect in the 
 
 101. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,  
J., concurring). 
 102. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of 
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 877 (1981). 
 103. Id. 
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service, but it does not settle the problem of appropriate liability 
when the public at large, or bystanders, are harmed by the act. For 
this dilemma, the evolution of products liability is again 
informative. It wasn’t long after the concept of strict liability for 
product defects became widespread that courts began extending 
this protection to non-user and non-consumer third parties.104 The 
purpose: public policy considerations.105 The lack of a consumer-
producer relationship has no bearing on the analysis in a strict 
liability claim. While not all jurisdictions provide equivalent 
protection for users as for non-users, those extending the protection 
have recognized that “[t]here is no adequate rationale or theoretical 
explanation why non-users and non-consumers should be denied 
recovery against the manufacturer of a defective product. The 
reason for extending the strict liability doctrine to innocent 
bystanders is the desire to minimize risks of personal injury and/or 
property damage.”106 While the Restatement is written to protect 
“the user or consumer or . . . his property,” the notes in the 
Restatement make clear that it takes no position on the matter of 
bystanders.107 And despite the text of the Restatement, there is 
widespread agreement in tort law that bystanders are able to 
recover for injuries despite a lack of privity or relationship with the 
manufacturer.108 This is in line with the public policy objectives of 
not only strict products liability, but also tort law generally. 
V. SOME ISSUES WITH STRICT SERVICE LIABILITY 
Will strict liability for services end innovation? Many have 
wondered if any regulation will destroy innovation. And though 
innovation is a common argument against interference in the 
marketplace, the gig economy may be, itself, a product of 
regulation.109 Existing regulations created sizable room to reduce 
costs and improve services. Undoubtedly a shift to strict liability 
 
 104. See Frederic N. Schneider, Tort: Recovery by a Bystander in Strict Liability, 8  
TULSA L.J. 216 (1972) (noting at the time, a “contemporary trend toward consumer 
protection . . . [extending] strict tort liability to manufacturers and retailers for injuries 
caused by their defective products to non-user and non-consumer third parties”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969). 
 107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cvt. (1) (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
 108. Michael J. Toke, Restatement (Third) of Torts and Design Defectiveness in American 
Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L.& PUB. POL’Y 239, 256 (1996). 
 109. Supra Part I. Admittedly the claim is made that such innovation to avoid regulation 
is less innovation and more creative maneuvering. 
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will encourage more maneuvering by gig companies to shield 
themselves from liability; however, unlike independent contractor 
status—the two-edged sword that doubly benefits gig companies—
maneuvering around strict liability would require risk prevention 
measures that advance general social welfare. Rather than 
innovating ways around existing regulations, that creativity could 
be utilized to produce safety solutions and improved risk 
mitigation. Cost cutting and optimization could still motivate 
innovation, but towards greater efficiency rather than reduced fees, 
fines, and judgements. 
There are also lingering questions remaining about 
applicability. What about companies such as Expedia and other 
middlemen which merely connect consumers to producers, but not 
under the guise of offering a service? On the surface, this appears 
no different than the producer-retailer-consumer relationship that 
has developed over the past century. The point of strict liability is 
not to create new causes of action against providers or retailers, but 
to bring forward the entity that is best situated to address the risks 
of its products. In the service space, a cab company that advertises 
its service, brands its vehicles, and registers its drivers has taken the 
affirmative steps of qualifying a service to the market. These actions 
function as consent to be subject to the rules of the marketplace. A 
company like Uber might suggest that it is merely the “retailer” of 
ridesharing service providers.  
But the independent drivers have not assented to the 
marketplace—they have assented to Uber. They do not acquiesce 
to any terms of market complicity by contracting with Uber—Uber 
is the entity engaging with the market. Uber manages the drivers. 
Gig services exist for handyman services. They advertise their 
offerings, require agreement of terms of service for engaging as  
a contractor, and manage the client relationship. These companies 
have assented to the marketplace. This can be differentiated  
from other services, such as Angie’s List, which provides 
recommendations, but neither facilitates client maintenance nor 
directs the actions of the service provider, or from services like 
Expedia, which intermediate the sale of service-products for  
known providers.  
A. The Problem with Differentiating Service Providers 
There is another class of companies within the gig economy 
which does not follow the clean groupings presented above.  
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Uber arguably controls the driver both with terms of service and 
also by directing the driver to passengers and to passengers’ 
destinations—managed by Uber. But there are also true ridesharing 
companies—companies that setup carpools of strangers who desire 
to share a ride, not provide a ride. These services seek to pair two or 
more people who are heading in the same direction, say 
commuting to work, for greater efficiency. What then of the liability 
for these companies? To some extent, the companies direct the 
drivers and may even advertise and perform other activities which 
suggest they have assented to the requirements of the marketplace. 
Many of these types of services even receive kickbacks in the form 
of tip-sharing or user fees. Weighing heavily on the liability 
analysis are user perception, how the service is advertised, and how 
the service is managed. Where Uber markets a cheaper taxi, these 
ridesharing services advertise catching a ride with a stranger.110 
Control of the provider would also factor into the discussion. While 
Uber requires vehicles of certain model years and certain levels of 
cleanliness, among other terms for its drivers,111 the average 
ridesharing apps do not.112 
Like these carpools, other services connect strangers who are 
willing to volunteer, or sell, a service or offering, with those 
interested in the offer. Many times, these services operate as 
tailored forums and provide little in the way of planning, logistics, 
or actual pairing of the offeror with the recipient. Popular services 
of this type have varied widely in purpose, from services that 
connect empty sofas to shoestring budget travelers, to those that 
connect gardeners in order to share surplus or unique plant seeds. 
The principles of strict service liability need not extend to every 
service that brings people together. By focusing on companies that 
market services with implied warranties, the test for liability may 
evolve but need not interfere with these other ventures. 
Finally, it was previously argued that extending existing 
principles of vicarious liability would simply push gig companies 
closer to the Amazon delivery model of moving the gig workers 
further away from the gig company, sheltering liability in 
independent LLCs. Wouldn’t strict liability do the same? Rather 
than relying on existing principles of vicarious liability which 
 
 110. Carpool, WAZE, https://www.waze.com/carpool (last visited Mar. 8, 2021). 
 111. Driver Requirements, supra note 44. 
 112. Carpool, supra note 110. 
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would require adapting long-established precedent of not just 
vicarious liability but also corporate liability, the standard for strict 
liability would look past the end-provider to the purveyor of the 
services and attach liability on the entity that offered the service to 
the marketplace, regardless of who provided it. This approach 
provides an adequate avenue for bringing claims against gig 
companies, regardless of the number of corporations between the 
company and the tort victim. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Service providers are the new producers. In this information 
age, we no longer must engage with the companies we contract 
with for services. Instead, we engage with the worker sent to do the 
task. This change in the privity structure of the service economy has 
necessitated a continuation of the liability evolution that started 
when retailers first started disconnecting consumers from 
manufacturers. Extending strict liability to include those who 
market services provides a reasonable recourse to address the 
escalating harms that are caused by those service providers and 
creates a system that incentivizes desired behaviors. 
